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I. INTRODUCTION
In the fifteenth century, the Vietnamese developed a comprehensive
legal code which became the country's governing body of law for more
than 300 years. That body of law is considered the most important legal
document in Vietnamese legal history.1 The work is popularly known as
the "Hong Duc Code' 2 or the "L8 Code."
The Code reflected the unusual genius of the Vietnamese legal tradi-
tion. Although influenced to some extent by Chinese law, the Code ad-
dressed the unique customs and practices of Vietnamese society 3 and
became a model for subsequent legal development in Vietnam.4 Some
practices were even accepted into modern Vietnamese law.5 Although
subsequent rulers rejected the Code, many of its provisions became cus-
toms in Vietnamese society. These customs traditionally had binding
force superior to that of official law.6
The L8 Code contained several advanced legal concepts that are
comparable or equivalent to those in modern western law. These con-
cepts included statutory rape, spousal immunity, a prohibition against ex
post facto law, a statute of limitations, the incapacity of minors to con-
tract, adverse possession, and easement. The L8 Code also recognized
the rights which Americans today regard as "fundamental civil liber-
ties." An accused under the L8 Code was entitled to a warrant before
arrest, release on bail, a speedy and public trial, and the confrontation of
1. Vu Van Mau, Foreword to Quoc TRIEU HINH LUAT (Penal Code of the I. Dynasty)
at v (Nguyen Si Giac trans. 1956) (Vietnam n.d.).
2. Historical literature written in Vietnamese generally refers to this document as the
"Hong Due Code." The name refers to the title by which the reign of Emperor U Thanh
Tong is known. This reign was believed to be responsible for the promulgation of the Code.
However, there is evidence indicating that a substantial portion of the Code was in existence
even before the Hong Due period. The Code was also modified from time to time by subse-
quent rulers of the L6 dynasty. Therefore, an accurate name for the document should be "IU
Code," rather than the "Hong Due Code," to reflect the authorship of the L8 dynasty as a
whole. See infra text accompanying notes 209-214.
3. Vu VAN MAu, DAN LUAT KHAI LUAN (General Notions of Civil Law) 495 (2d ed.
1961).
4. Vu Van Mau, supra note 1, at xii, xxi.
5. See infra text accompanying note 39.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 34-37.
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witnesses. This Note selects these concepts for comparison because they
most closely resemble concepts found in United States jurisprudence. An
examination of the similarities between these concepts and their counter-
parts in modem United States law shows the advanced state of tradi-
tional Vietnamese law during the fifteenth century.
This Note examines traditional Vietnamese law from the perspective
of modem United States law to study the meaning of the former, its ad-
vanced features, and its application in traditional Vietnamese society.
This analysis seeks to enhance an understanding of how Vietnamese soci-
ety dealt with legal problems which are common to modem United
States jurisprudence and how some legal concepts were formulated and
applied in a society that is very different from modem American society.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LE CODE
A. Historical Context
1. The Establishment of the Le Dynasty
At the beginning of the fifteenth century, Vietnam was briefly occu-
pied by the Chinese.7 This occupation led to a liberation struggle that
lasted for more than ten years. In 1427 under the leadership of L8 Loi,8
the Vietnamese drove out the Chinese,9 reclaimed their independence,
and re-established the Vietnamese state.10
Le Loi ascended the throne in the same year and established the L6
Dynasty. The L6 Dynasty lasted for 360 years, from 1428 to 1788, and
consisted of two major periods, the "unified" and the "decline" periods."1
Most of the accomplishments attributable to the Le Dynasty oc-
curred during the unified period, the first one hundred years of the dy-
7. 2 Lf VAN Huu, PHAN PHU TIEN, NGO SI LIEN, PHAM CONG TRU, & LE HY, DAI
VIET Su KY TOAN THU (Complete Book of History of Great Vietnam) 235 (Hoang Van Lau
trans. 1985) (Vietnam 1697) [hereinafter D.V.S.K.]. The book was submitted to the Throne by
the last author, U. Hy, in October of 1697. 1 NGo CAO LANG, LICH TRIEU TAP KY (Official
Journal of the L Dynasty) 149 (Hoa Bang trans. 1975) (Vietnam n.d.).
8. 1 TRAN TRONG KIM, VIET NAM Su Luoc (Brief History of Vietnam) 218 (1971).
9. D.V.S.K., supra note 7, at 281-82; 1 TRAN TRONG KIM, supra note 8, at 234. The
Vietnamese forced the Chinese to accept a negotiated withdrawal. Id.; see also NGUYEN
LUONG BICH, NGUYEN TRAi DANH GIAC Cuu Nuoc (Nguyen Trai - Fighting to Save the
Country) 469-70 (1973).
10. Whithmore, Vietnamese Historical Sources For the Reign of L( Thanh Tong (1460-
1497), 29 J. ASIAN STUD. 373, 373 (1970).
11. 1 TA VAN TAi, NGUYEN NGOC HUY, & TRAN VAN LIEM, THE Lt CODE: LAW IN
TRADITIONAL VIETNAM, A COMPARATIVE SINO-VIETNAMESE LEGAL STUDY WITH HISTOR-
ICAL-JURIDICAL ANALYSIS AND ANNOTATIONS 17 (1987) [hereinafter TAI, HuY, & LIEM];
D.V.S.K., supra note 7, at 291, 294 (quotations added).
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nasty. After L8 Loi, the throne passed to nine other emperors during the
unified period. 2 Among these rulers, Emperor L8 Thanh Tong was con-
sidered the most able.' 3 He was credited with many of the legal works
published during the L6 Dynasty. 4 These achievements earned him a
reputation as the most "imaginative and creative lawmaker" in
Vietnamese history.'" He devoted more attention to the development of
law than to most other areas during his reign.' 6 The L8 Code was en-
acted during his rule.
During the decline period, the next 260 years, there was no signifi-
cant contribution to the codification of the L8 Code. When the L6 Dy-
nasty collapsed in 1788, the Tay Son Dynasty came to power and ruled
the country until 1802, followed by the Nguyen Dynasty which ruled
until 1945. These subsequent dynasties did not recognize the L8 Code to
any substantial extent.
17
2. The Government Structure Under the L8 Dynasty
The study of a country's laws requires an understanding of the
structure of its government. Political institutions provide the medium
within which law develops and operates.
The government under the L8 Dynasty was an absolute monarchy.' 8
The emperor had unlimited power and ruled by a mandate from
Heaven." The emperor, however, was held accountable to the will of
Heaven. 2' This will, according to Professor L8 Kim Ngan, was reflected
in the will of the people.2 ' In short, to serve the will of the people was to
12. 1 TRAN TRONG KIM, supra note 8, at 276. The nine emperors were: La Thai Tong
(1434-1442), L8 Nhan Tong (1443-1459), L6 Thanh Tong (1460-1497), Le Hien Tong (1497-
1504), L6 Tuc Tong (1504), L6 Uy Muc (1505-1509), La Tuong Duc (1509-1516), Le Chieu
Tong (1516-1526), and L8 Cung Hoanh (1526-1527). Id. at 248-68.
13. See D.V.S.K., supra note 7, at 522-24 (eulogy of Emperor LE Thanh Tong written by
contemporary scholars upon his death).
14. 1 Vu VAN MAU, Co LUAT VIET NAM THONG KHAO VA Tu PHAP Su (Survey of
Vietnamese Ancient Law and Private Law History) 228, 233 (1974).
15. Young, The Law of Property and Elite Prerogatives During Vietnam's Li Dynasty,
1428-1788, 10 J. ASIAN HIST. 1, 13 (1976).
16. Id. at 15.
17. VU VAN MAU, supra note 14, at 251, 258.
18. Lf KIM NGAN, To CHUC CHINH QUYEN TRUNG UONG Duoi TRIEU Lf- THANH
TONG (1460-1497) (The Organization of Central Government Under The Reign of L6 Thanh
Tong (1460-1497)) at 35 (1963).
19. Id. at 40, 45; Vu Quoc THONG, PHAP CHE SU VIET NAM (Vietnamese Legal His-
tory) 50, 53 (1972); see also Young, supra note 15, at 4.
20. LP_ KIM NGAN, supra note 18, at 40, 45; Vu Quoc THONG, supra note 19, at 50-51.
21. Lif KIM NGAN, supra note 18, at 40; see also Vu Quoc THONG, supra note 19, at 55,
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serve the mandate of Heaven.
The governmental apparatus directly under the emperor consisted
of six Ministries (Bo): Civil Services (Lai), Civil Affairs (Ho), Protocol
(Le), Military (Binh), Punishments (Hinh), and Public Works (Cong).22
Officials serving in these Ministries were selected through examinations23
or nominations.24 The selection process sought to recruit only qualified
people for government service.
Each Ministry was charged with specific functions. For example,
the Ministry of Punishments enforced the law, managed litigation, and
reviewed judgments rendered by the courts.25 The functions of this Min-
istry were generally limited to judicial matters. Each Ministry had a sep-
arate and independent review agency which was empowered to inspect its
daily operations.26 The review agency of the Ministry of Punishments
was called the Criminal Review Agency. 27
Under the L8 Dynasty, there was no independent and separate judi-
ciary as in a modem constitutional government.2" Instead, the chief offi-
cial at each political division conducted all judicial proceedings within
his jurisdiction as well as performed his administrative duties.2 9
Since there was no legislature or lawmaking body, the emperor was
officially responsible for handing down the law. In reality, the emperor
would delegate the task of drafting the law to certain scholars who would
complete the work and present it to the emperor for approval.3 0 If ap-
proved, the emperor would decree that the work become the official body
of law. This document would then become binding on all individuals and
government agencies.
The L8 Code was a comprehensive code. It established the frame-
work upon which the government was organized. The governmental
structure during the L6 Dynasty was, to some extent, a creature of the Le
Code. Thus, it was created to function within and reinforce the law.
22. Li KIM NGAN, supra note 18, at 52; Vu Quoc THONG, supra note 19, at 96; see also
D.V.S.K., supra note 7, at 413; 1 TRAN TRONG KIM, supra note 8, at 255-56.
23. 1 TRAN TRONG KIM, supra note 8, at 249.
24. D.V.S.K., supra note 7, at 303-04; see also Young, supra note 15, at 6.
25. Li KIM NGAN, supra note 18, at 69-71; 1 NGO CAo LANG, supra note 7, at 38.
26. Vu Quoc THONG, supra note 19, at 96; 1 NGo CAO LANG, supra note 7, at 38.
27. LE KIM NGAN, supra note 18, at 97; see also 1 NGo CAO LANG, supra note 7, at 391;
TRAN TRONG KIM, supra note 19, at 256.
28. LP_ KIM NGAN, supra note 18, at 99; VU Quoc THONG, supra note 19, at 403-04.
Independent and separate judiciary means an independent court system or judicial branch of
the government.
29. Vu Quoc THONG, supra note 19, at 407, 409. Levels of political division consisted of,
in descending order, province, prefecture, district, and village. Id. at 148, 409.
30. Lt KIM NGAN, supra note 18, at 45.
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B. Influence of the L6 Code on Subsequent Legal Development in
Vietnam
The L8 Code was a brilliant achievement of the Vietnamese legal
tradition. During the Le Dynasty, law had a recognized and respected
role in governance.31 Soon after ascending the throne, Emperor L8 Thai
To proclaimed that "[f]rom the beginning of time, to govern the country,
there must be law. Without law, there will be chaos. Therefore, our
forefathers have made laws to teach people what is good, what is evil; to
do good, to avoid harm; and not to break the laws."32
The law of each society reflects not only the social conditions of the
state, but also the spirit and traditions of the people.33 The existence of
certain laws indicates the presence of a particular problem the law was
intended to address. The factual contours of the problem may change,
but certain underlying principles such as fairness to litigants, integrity of
the judicial system, or preservation of cultural values and national heri-
tage remain consistent. Although the subsequent rulers of the Nguyen
Dynasty enacted a new legal code, which was copied from the Chinese
Ching Code, the Vietnamese continued to adhere to the L6 Code under
the guise of traditions and customs.34 The people resisted change partly
because the Nguyen Code was not concerned with the "pragmatic social
arrangements such as contract, inheritance or land tenure" which were
norms under the U Dynasty.35
The value of a body of law depends more on its acceptance than on
the fact of its enactment. This is particularly true in Vietnamese society
where the people are accustomed to the maxim Phep Vua thua le lang
(Village customs take precedence to the King's orders.).3 6 As a result,
31. See generally Young, supra note 15, at 13-21.
32. D.V.S.K., supra note 7, at 292. History records an instance in which Emperor U
Thai To used law to deal with an immediate social problem. In the first years of his rule, there
were many vagrants who did not work. Instead, they engaged in unproductive activities such
as gambling and drinking. Emperor L6 Thai To issued an edict imposing a stiff penalty for
such conduct. The edict read:
Whoever is caught drinking shall have three centimeters of his finger cut off; for
gambling, if caught, shall have one centimeter of his finger cut off; whoever gathered
to drink shall be punished with 100 strokes of stick penalty; whoever tolerates them
shall be subject to the same punishment but with one degree reduction.
Id. at 299.
33. 1 Vu VAN MAU, supra note 14, at 5.
34. Id. at 7; see also Whithmore, supra note 10, at 374; Young, supra note 15, at 2; Corre-
spondence from Professor Ta Van Tai to Patricia Elisa, Ohio University Press 5 (Apr. 22,
1981) (Available at Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.) [hereinafter Correspondence].
35. Young, supra note 15, at 2.
36. Vu Quoc THONG, supra note 19, at 57-58. See generally Young, supra note 15, at 1.
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the fifteenth century's laws became the nineteenth century's CUStOmS. 3 7
The resistance to change demonstrates the significance of the L8
Code and its influence on subsequent legal development. Despite official
rejection by the Nguyen Dynasty, the LE Code laid a concrete foundation
for later legal development in Vietnam. Professor Vu Van Mau3 com-
mented that:
The law under the L6 Dynasty was a true reflection of Vietnamese
society. Because it was in accordance with social and religious condi-
tions, the U_ Court's law had a significant influence on the people. To-
day, a large number of customs in marriage or family law still reflect
the provisions in the L8 Code. 39
Thus, although the Le Code did not become an official body of law
in modem Vietnam, it set the standard upon which the Vietnamese legal
tradition subsequently would develop.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. The Purposes of Comparison
The L8 Code is different from modem United States law in most
respects. It came into existence in a different society, was influenced by
different social and cultural values, and was the product of a different
way of thinking. Undoubtedly, the drafters of the L6 Code intended that
it serve different purposes or assume different missions within the
Vietnamese legal and social order. Out of these differences, however,
emerge striking similarities between the two legal systems. The similari-
ties establish a bridge of understanding between the two bodies of law.
A comparison with western jurisprudence explains some traditional
Vietnamese legal concepts in modem legal language. In comparing
Vietnamese concepts to their comparable counterparts in United States
law, knowledge of the latter can help explain the nature of the former.
For example, understanding the underlying purpose of statutory rape law
in United States jurisprudence sheds light on why the L6 Dynasty
37. Young, supra note 15, at 2.
38. Professor Vu Van Mau was formerly Dean and Professor of Law at Saigon University
Faculty of Law, First President of the Vietnamese Supreme Court of Appeal, and President of
the National Association of Comparative Law. 50 INT'L WHO's WHO 1986-1987, at 1666
(1986). He authored numerous legal publications including QUAN NIEM Co TRUYEN VE
PHAP LUAT DONG PHUONG (Ancient Legal Traditions in East Asia) (1956), CAc HE THONG
PHAP LUAT TREN THF GIoi (Legal Systems in the World) (1957), DAN LUAT KHAI LUAN
(General Notions of Civil Law) (1961), and Co LUAT VIET NAM Luoc KHAO (Survey of
Vietnamese Ancient Law) (1973).
39. Vu VAN MAU, supra note 3, at 251.
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lawmakers promulgated a similar provision. Comparative law furthers
the understanding of one legal system on the basis of knowledge of an-
other system.' Given the age of the L6 Code, its long period of nonuse,
the scarcity of scholarly materials on the subject, and the lack of knowl-
edge about the Code in the West, it is difficult to present traditional
Vietnamese law meaningfully without the aid of literature about United
States law.
This comparison utilizes American legal terms in explaining tradi-
tional Vietnamese law. When two different and unrelated legal systems
refer to a legal concept, they do not necessarily refer to the same thing.
When the lawmakers under the L6 Dynasty promulgated law on some
requirements which resemble the United States concepts of arrest war-
rant, bail, speedy and public trial, they may have been codifying common
practices or customs long adopted in that society. This Note, however,
refers to these entitlements as "fundamental rights of an accused." The
borrowing of this uniquely American labeling is necessary for a compara-
tive discussion of the concepts in terms of constitutional protection, the
rationale and purpose of each concept, the protection of the accused from
potential abuse of power by the state, and the balancing of state and indi-
vidual interests.
Similarly, when the traditional Vietnamese lawmakers promulgated
the provisions on statutes of limitations or the incapacity of minors to
contract, there is no indication that they meant to pronounce a civil law
on contractual limitations or any "statute of limitations." Rather the
provisions are technically criminal in nature because they prescribe plain
prohibition of certain practices and provide penal sanctions for viola-
tions. It makes no sense, however, to explain these provisions in terms of
criminal law as they are understood in United States jurisprudence. A
comparative analysis enables us to better relate practices of a traditional
society with more familiar concepts in the United States legal tradition in
order to further understand the traditional society.
Additionally, a comparison provides a different perspective from
which to view the United States legal tradition. From this perspective,
one can appreciate a larger picture of modem United States law. One
commentator reasons that:
When one is immersed in his own law, in his own country, unable to
see things from without, he has a psychologically unavoidable ten-
40. See generally, Escarra, The Aims of Comparative Law, 7 TEMP. L.Q. 296 (1933);
LePaulle, The Functions of Comparative Law: With A Critique of Sociological Jurisprudence, 35
HARV. L. REV. 838 (1922).
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dency to consider as natural, as necessary, as given by God, things
which are simply due to historical accident or temporary social situa-
tion .... To see things in their true light, we must see them from a
certain distance, as strangers, which is impossible when we study any
phenomena of our own country.4 1
B. Protections Under Substantive Laws
The L6 Code does not distinguish between substantive and proce-
dural laws. The Code, however, provides numerous protections to indi-
viduals in criminal proceedings. Using United States legal classification,
some of these protections are identified as substantive and others proce-
dural. The substantive law protections selected for comparison here are
statutory rape, spousal immunity, and the prohibition of ex post facto
laws.
1. Statutory Rape
Rape is generally defined as a "non-consensual sexual intercourse
with a female."4 2 However, when the female is at or below a certain age,
modem law considers such intercourse as rape regardless of the female's
consent.43 This offense is commonly known as statutory rape.44
The lawmakers under the L8 Dynasty recognized this class of sex
offenses. Article 404 of the L6 Code provides that "[s]exual intercourse
with a girl aged twelve or less, even with her consent, shall be punished
as rape."' 45 An imperial decree issued during the Hong Duc period of the
L6 Dynasty states that "illegitimate sexual intercourse with a young girl
aged twelve or less, even with consent, is considered rape."'46 These pro-
visions reflect several characteristics of the modem statutory offense.
First, they designate a specific age of the victim above which the offense
does not apply. Second, the girl's consent or lack of consent is irrelevant
to the determination of culpability. These provisions unequivocally dic-
tate that "even with consent" the act still violates the law. Third, the law
41. LePaulle, supra note 40, at 858.
42. G. Dix & M. SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 498 (3d ed. 1987).
43. 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.1 comment 6 (1980).
44. G. Dix & M. SHARLOT, supra note 42, at 515-16.
45. LP, C. art. 404. The English text of the L6 Code is printed in 1 TAI, Huy, & LIEM,
supra note 11. See also Ta Van Tai, The Status of Women in Traditional Vietnam: A Compari-
son of the Code of the LoFDynasty (1428-1788) With the Chinese Codes, 15 J. ASIAN Hisr. 97,
113 (1981).
46. HONG Duc THIEN CHINH THU (Book of Good Government of the Hong Duc Pe-
riod) para. 262 (Nguyen Si Giac trans. 1959) (Vietnam 1560) [hereinafter H.D.T.C.T.].
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treats the act as an offense in order to further a public interest, the pro-
tection of minors.
United States jurisdictions recognize a very similar concept. The
Model Penal Code defines statutory rape as sexual intercourse with a
female where the latter is "less than 10 years old"'4 7 or "less than [16]
years old and the actor is at least [four] years older than the [female]." 4
This elaborate definition distinguishes the offense from an ordinary rape
where sexual intercourse is imposed upon the female either "without
[her] consent,"'49 "against her will," 50 or "by force and against [her]
will."51 All of these formulas require the absence of consent.
The Vietnamese and United States laws recognize several compara-
ble concepts. First, the female's consent or lack thereof is immaterial
because consent is not an element of the offense. 2 At or below the statu-
tory age of consent, the female is incapable of giving consent or her con-
sent is legally impossible. 3 Thus, in any sexual relationship involving a
young girl at or below a certain age the male offender risks punishment
because the female's consent is legally invalid.
The statutory age of consent varies from one society to another, but
the statutory rape laws designate an age that is lower than the legal age
of maturity. 4 The Model Penal Code reasons that a young girl is
"deemed incapable of giving effective consent."' 5 The designation of the
age of consent at the age lower than the legal maturity age limits the
application of the statute to cases in which the victim is at an extremely
young age. At an age between the consent and maturity ages, the female
is a minor but her consent is valid and thus statutory rape law does not
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(d) (1980).
48. Id. § 213.3(1)(a).
49. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 152 (2d ed. 1969).
50. Baxter v. State, 80 Neb. 840, 842, 115 N.W. 534, 534 (1908).
51. Starr v. State, 205 Wis. 310, 311, 237 N.W. 96, 97 (1931).
52. Compare People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 531, 393 P.2d 673, 674, 39 Cal. Rptr.
361, 362 (1964) (Lack of consent of the female is an element of the offense but the law
presumes its absence.) with La C. art. 404.
53. Stevens v. State, 231 Ark. 734, 735, 332 S.W.2d 482, 482 (1960) (The tender age of a
ten year old girl makes her consent "legally impossible."); see also Fields v. State, 203 Ark.
1046, 1048-49, 159 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1942) (consent of a 12 year old girl would not protect the
defendant in a conviction of rape); People v. Courtney, 180 Cal. App. 2d 61, 62, 4 Cal. Rptr.
274, 276 (1960).
54. The L Code considers 15 to be the age of legal maturity. Compare Lta C. art. 285
(Men of 15 can be conscripted into military services.) and id. art. 313 (Orphans aged 15 or
over can sell themselves.) and id. art. 347 (Person at age of 15 is entitled to distribution of
land.) and id. art. 404 (the age of consent is 12) with 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMEN-
TARIES § 213.3 comment 2 (1980).
55. 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.3 comment 2, at 380 (1980).
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apply. Rather the minor victim must be young enough to invoke the
statute. The distinction between the age of maturity and that of consent
thus reflects the lawmakers' recognition of the different problems involv-
ing sex offenses against females at different ages. A younger child is
more vulnerable to adult inducement and needs more protection from
the law. The law on statutory rape is designed to provide such additonal
protection.
Statutory rape is a strict liability crime.56 Because of the young age
of the victim, the law presumes liability on the part of the male even if
the victim consented to the sexual act.57
The purpose of these statutory rape provisions is to protect young
girls from illicit acts of sexual intercourse."8 The state has an interest in
protecting "immature females from older males who would take advan-
tage of [the females]."5 9 The law recognizes that "unwise disposition of
[a girl's] sexual favor is deemed to do harm both to herself and the social
mores by which the community's conduct patterns are established."60
The distinct concepts found in both laws address the different
problems associated with the law on sex offenses. Apparently the
lawmakers in both societies sought to fine tune the laws to balance the
interests of both the victim and the offender.
2. Spousal Immunity
Spousal immunity refers generally to the privilege of not being com-
pelled by law to act against the interest of one's spouse. This privilege
56. People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 135, 46 P. 915, 916 (1896) ("The protection of society, of
the family, and of the infant, demand that one who has carnal intercourse under such circum-
stances shall do so in peril of the fact, and he will not be heard against the evidence to urge his
belief that the victim of his outrage has passed the period which would make his act a crime.").
California has created a limited exception to Ratz by recognizing a defense to statutory rape
when the defendant has a good faith and reasonable belief that the female is 18 years or more
of age, and the female is very close to the age of consent. People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d at
536, 393 P.2d at 677-78, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66 (The female was 17 years and 9 months of age
and voluntarily engaged in sexual intercourse with defendant.); see also Commission on His-
tory of Cal., Oral History: Justice Joseph R. Grodin, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7, 49-50
(1988).
57. TA VAN TAI, THE VIETNAMESE TRADITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 217 (1988); see also
2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.1 comment 6, at 326 (1980).
58. People v. Courtney, 180 Cal. App. 2d 61, 62, 4 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276 (1960) (Statutory
rape applies to sexual intercourse with a female who is under 18 years of age and who is not
the wife of the male, regardless of whether the female is married or the act is consensual.).
59. 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.1 comment 6 (1980).
60. People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 531, 393 P.2d 673, 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 362
(1964).
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was implicitly recognized in the L6 Code. Article 39 of the L8 Code
provides:
The mutual concealment of any unlawful act shall not constitute an
offense if committed by persons belonging to the following relation-
ships: (1) relatives of the dai cong (third) or closer degree of mourning
[relationship]; (2) maternal grandparents and their grandchildren; (3) a
person and his or her paternal grandsons' wives; (4) a woman and her
husband's elder or younger brothers; (5) a man and his elder or
younger brothers' wives.61
To implement this privilege, Article 665 also provides that
"[p]ersons allowed by law to conceal one another's offenses... shall not
be summoned to provide testimony.",62
These provisions resemble the modem doctrine of "spousal immu-
nity" except that the latter applies only to the husband and wife relation-
ship. In modem western law, a spouse generally cannot be compelled to
testify against the other spouse in a criminal prosecution except where
the crime charged is one committed by the accused upon the testifying
spouse.63 Section 970 of the California Evidence Code provides that "a
married person has a privilege not to testify against his spouse in any
proceeding."'  Section 971 of the same Code provides that "a married
person whose spouse is a party to a proceeding has a privilege not to be
called as a witness by an adverse party to that proceeding without the
prior express consent of the spouse having the privilege."65
The earliest traceable ruling in common law which recognized the
spousal privilege against adverse testimony was recorded in 1580 where
the Chancery Court of England held that the wife's testimony against her
husband must be suppressed because she was incapable of testifying
against her husband.66 In 1839, the United States Supreme Court, in
confirming that doctrine, held that:
This rule is founded upon the deepest and soundest principles of our
nature. Principles which have grown out of those domestic relations,
that constitute the basis of civil society; and which are essential to the
61. LP C. art. 39.
62. Id. art. 665.
63. Annotation, Competency of One Spouse to Testify in Federal Criminal Prosecution of
Other, 97 L.Ed. 607, 613 (1952). See generally, C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 66 (E. Cleary
3d ed. 1984); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2228, 2334 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). The
spouse was said to be disqualified from testifying either for or against his or her spouse. Id
§ 2228, at 212 (quoting E. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITLETON 6b (1628)).
64. CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (West 1966).
65. Id. § 971.
66. Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (1580), cited in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 63, § 2227.
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enjoyment of that confidence which should subsist between those who
are connected by the nearest and dearest relations of life. To break
down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of hus-
band and wife, would be to destroy the best solace of human
existence.
67
The Court specifically recognized the interest of preserving harmony
in a marital relationship. This interest is preferred to the interest of serv-
ing justice. However, the doctrine was not settled until recently. 6 Not
until 1958 did the United States Supreme Court acknowledge that "[t]he
basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or husband
against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a belief that
such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for the bene-
fit of [the] husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the public as
well. , 6
9
The Court now recognizes the interest of society as well as that of
the family in providing such immunity. On the one hand, requiring such
testimony would do violence to the peace of the family and disrupt the
basic unit of society. On the other hand, precluding such testimony
would inhibit the administration of justice, perhaps allowing the accused
to escape the judgment of law. The opinions of the Supreme Court, how-
ever, have recognized the state's prevailing interest in protecting the fam-
ily unit, even at the cost of excluding reliable evidence.
The L6 Code accepts the same cost when it allows one to conceal an
unlawful act committed by one's relative.70 The trade-off reflects the
lawmakers' acknowledgement that the administration of justice should
not be achieved at any cost. The law instead chooses to preserve familial
harmony even at the cost of inhibiting the search for the truth. The laws
in both societies apparently balance the competing interests to seek the
best resolution of the problem. Society as a whole benefits the most from
this balancing act.
67. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839) (wife could not testify to facts
which would discredit her husband and indicate that he had committed perjury). It is debata-
ble whether immunity from compulsory testimony is necessary to preserve the peace within
families or marital unity. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 63, § 2228, at 214-21.
68. See infra note 69.
69. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958) (wife could not be allowed to testify,
even voluntarily, against her husband in a Mann Act prosecution). The Court, however, in
1980, modified the restriction and allowed spouse's voluntary adverse testimony. Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). The Trammel Court held that "the witness spouse alone
has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor
foreclosed from testifying." Id. at 53.
70. Li C. art. 39.
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3. Ex Post Facto Laws
It is a deeply rooted tradition in modem law that a person cannot be
charged with a crime that is not proscribed by law. The American Law
Institute explains: "[T]hat American courts cannot declare new offenses
and apply them to facts that have already transpired should be beyond
doubt. Nor do the courts possess general authority to declare behavior
to be criminal simply because it violates community morals."71
The lawmakers under the L8 Dynasty adhered to a very similar
idea. The last article of the L8 Code, placed as if it were an epilogue to
the entire body of law, states that:
In determining whether a wrongful act constitutes an offense of a spe-
cific name governed by a provision of law, any trial judge who takes
the liberty of going beyond, or failing to apply fully, a specifically ap-
plicable article of law, or who refers to peripheral articles in order to
mitigate or aggravate the case on his own shall receive a penalty one
degree higher than that imposed for mitigation or aggravation of a
case.
72
The official function of the judge, under the L8 Code, was to apply
the law and not to make it.73 The L8 Code contains several provisions
aimed at ensuring proper application of the law. First, judgments must
quote "the original texts of all relevant statutes, decrees, rulings, and in-
structions."'74  For example, in a criminal case, the judge would cite the
specific provision of law which applied. This requirement was included
to ensure strict application of the law. The lawmakers of the Le Dynasty
were concerned that paraphrasing the law would subject it to inconsis-
tent interpretations or improper applications. Second, a ruling based on
stare decisis is allowed only if the prior decision has been "promulgated
as a permanent ruling."'7' This provision underscores the distinction be-
tween binding and non-binding precedents. The distinction implies that
a judicial ruling does not automatically become binding unless it has been
reviewed and recognized by appropriate authority. Third, judges are not
allowed to modify the law, either by aggravating or mitigating an of-
71. 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.05 comment 3, at 80 (1980).
Model Penal Code § 1.05(1) states that "[n]o conduct constitutes an offense unless it is a crime
or violation under this Code or another statute of this State." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05(1)
(1980).
72. L C. art. 722.
73. Id. It is debatable, as in any common law legal system, whether judges make law by
pronouncing the meaning of a particular statute or code.
74. L C. art. 683.
75. Id. art. 685.
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fense.76 Adjusting the offense would simply be one way to modify the
law. A 1718 decree, issued near the end of the L8 Dynasty, ordered that
"[flor all cases involving penal sanctions, the penalty can be imposed
only when the law takes effect; prior to that time, any different judgment
should adhere to the old regulations with respect to the more lenient
sanction provisions. This is to reflect the generosity of the State.' 77
The Constitution of the United States specifically prohibits ex post
facto 78 legislation.79 In Calder v. Bull,80 the leading case on the ex post
facto clause, the Court listed types of penal enactments which would
violate the clause:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes
such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed.
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when commit-
ted.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives
less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender."1
There are striking similarities between the provisions of the L8 Code
and the admonitions listed in the Calder opinion. First, the law that
criminalizes an act must exist prior to the commission of the act. The L6
Code requires that the act must "constitute an offense of a specific name
governed by a provision of law." 2 The Calder admonition clearly prohib-
76. Id. art. 686, paras. 1-3.
77. 1 NGo CAO LANG, supra note 7, at 303-04.
78. The ex post facto principle is popularly known in the West as nulla poena sine lege or
"no conduct may be held criminal unless it is precisely described in a penal law." In Western
Europe, the concept was not recognized until the eighteenth century. There was some mani-
festation of the principle of nulla poena sine lege in the Magna Carta of 1215, but this is not
enough to conclude that it originated from this document. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 28-31 (2d ed. 1960). One commentator traced the principle's early signifi-
cance to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL
LAW: THE GENERAL PART 575 (2d ed. 1961). The antecedent of the concept, however, did
not have a "definite approximation" until the rise of the English Parliament in early seven-
teenth century. J. HALL, supra, at 30-31.
79. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Although the clause does not specifically apply to the
judiciary, the courts have refused to violate the principle. See United States v. Harris, 347 U.S.
612, 617 (1954).
80. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
81. Id. at 390 (emphasis in original).
82. LP C. art. 722 (emphasis added).
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its the punishment of an act which was "done before the passing of the
law, and which was innocent when done.",83 In short, the law must pre-
cede the act that the law condemns.
Second, a law cannot aggravate the offense. The L8 Code prohibits
judges from "aggravating or mitigating an offense."84 The Calder admo-
nition prohibits "[e]very law that aggravates a crime."85 Although the
Calder ruling does not explicitly prohibit mitigation of an offense, the
provisions in both the L8 Code and the Calder opinion oppose changes in
the law that act to the detriment of the defendant.
Third, both laws prohibit the retroactive application of law if it re-
sults in a more severe penalty for the act that was committed prior to the
change. A 1718 decree of the L8 Dynasty suggests that if the new law
imposes greater penal sanctions, the judge should "adhere to the old reg-
ulations" and apply the more lenient sanctions.86 This provision implies
that the defendant may benefit from the new law which imposes a less
severe penalty. Similarly, the Calder admonition only prohibits applica-
tion of any "law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater pun-
ishment."87 Both provisions are silent on changes in law that would
impose a lesser punishment. Thus, it may be fair to conclude that, in
both systems, a new law does not apply to an act previously committed
except when the new law imposes a lesser sanction.
The lawmakers in both systems recognized the role of law and the
necessity of its proper application. In short, an act must be judged by
existing law. Alteration in application of the law may pose a risk of mod-
ifying the law itself.
C. Protections Under Procedural Laws
Along with substantive law protections, the L8 Code provides a
large number of protections under procedural law. Several of these pro-
visions resemble the fundamental rights of an accused granted under the
United States Constitution. These rights are selected for comparison in
part because they resemble the constitutional rights in United States ju-
risprudence, and in part because they show a clear concern for the rights
of an accused in criminal proceedings under the L8 Code. These rights
include a warrant requirement for arrest, bail, speedy and public trial,
and confrontation of adversarial witnesses.
83. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 390 (emphasis omitted).
84. Lf C. art. 686, paras. 1-3.
85. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 390 (emphasis omitted).
86. 1 NGO CAo LANG, supra note 7, at 303-04.
87. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390 (emphasis omitted).
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1. Warrant for Arrest
An arrest warrant is a written order issued by a court or magistrate
authorizing the arrest of a person."8 The L8 Code provides that to arrest
a person, the government must first obtain "a warrant bearing the seal of
the responsible head of service."89 Further, the warrant must be consid-
ered and issued by the judge himself.90 This requirement ensures that the
arrest is judicially authorized. The restriction embraces several concepts.
First, there is a separation of authority between the officials who want to
make an arrest and those who can authorize it. Second, there are only
certain predesignated officials who can authorize the issuance of a war-
rant. Third, the restriction on the government is directed toward the
prevention of arbitrary arrest.
The issuance and execution of the warrant must comply with several
requirements. First, only the officials specifically designated on the war-
rant are allowed to execute the warrant,91 and their names must be writ-
ten on the document.92 Second, the warrant must bear the seal of a
judge.93 The presence of the seal as a means of authentication indicates
that the judge has seen and authorized the warrant. Upon execution of
the warrant, the authorized officers "must present the warrant to the pre-
fectural or district official" and ask the latter to "perform the arrest and
turn the accused over to [them]." 94 This special feature contemplates
minimal intrusion of the arrestee's privacy because the local officials are
presumably in a better position to conduct the arrest with the least
disruption.
In United States jurisdictions, the requirement of a warrant for
arrest stems from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. The provision guarantees that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
88. 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 54 (12th ed. 1974).
89. L C. art. 704, para. 2 ("Those who illegally arrest a person without a warrant bear-
ing the seal of the responsible head of service shall be demoted two grades.").
90. Id. art. 673, para. 4 ("For complaints in the provinces, judges must examine the facts,
sign these complaints, and summon the parties concerned for questioning.").
91. Lt C. art. 673, para. 2 ("For summoning and arresting litigants, they must use pris-
oner escort officers (ap nguc giam) or public mission officers (cong sai giam) and shall not
improperly appoint other supplementary officers.").
92. Id. art. 701 ("Judicial clerks in charge of preparing warrants who, after writing
thereon the name of one officer, hand the document over to another for execution shall be
demoted three grades.").
93. Id. art. 704.
94. LP C. art. 702, para. 1; see also TA VAN TAI, supra note 57, at 63; Lt TRIEU CHIEU
LINH THIEN CHINH (Edicts and Decrees Promulgated for good Government of the L Dy-
nasty) 449 (Nguyen Si Giac trans. 1961) (Vietnam 1705).
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and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 95
To implement this guarantee, modem United States law imposes
several typical requirements. First, the warrant must be signed and
sealed by the judicial officer who issued the warrant.96 Second, the issu-
ance of a warrant must be based on "reasonable ground to believe that
the defendant has committed [a particular offense]." 97 An arrest war-
rant, generally, must specify the name of the defendant, the time of issu-
ance, the jurisdiction where it is issued, and it must be signed by a
judicial officer.98 Modem United States law is not as strict about who
can make the arrest as was the L8 Code.99 Generally, it allows an officer,
upon securing an arrest warrant, "to make the arrest at anytime and any
place." 1"
The provisions on arrest warrants in the L8 Code and modem
United States law display two major similarities. First, the regulations
ensure that an arrest is judicially authorized. The L6 Code requires that
the warrant bear the seal of the judge. 101 Modem United States law re-
quires that the warrant be signed and sealed by the issuing judicial of-
ficer.10 2 The judicial authorization underscores the separation of power
between those who make the arrest and those who authorize the arrest.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
96. Oates v. Bullock, 136 Ala. 537, 546, 33 So. 835, 837 (1902) ("A paper in the form of
and intended to be a warrant and issued as such is void unless it is actually signed by the
magistrate issuing it."); see State v. Haines, 153 Me. 465, 465, 138 A.2d 460, 460-61
(1958)(warrant is void if not sealed). Rule 4(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides: "The warrant shall be signed by the magistrate and shall contain the name of the
defendant or, if his name is unknown, any name or description by which he can be identified
with reasonable certainty .... " FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(1). Many jurisdictions have abolished
the requirement of seal as a means of authentication. California no longer requires the seal of a
court to be fixed on legal documents such as writs, summons, or warrant of arrest. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 153 (West 1982).
97. CAL. PENAL CODE § 813 (West 1985).
98. Id. § 815.
99. Section 816 of California Penal Code states:
A warrant of arrest shall be directed generally to any peace officer, or to any public
officer or employee authorized to serve process where the warrant is for a violation of
a statute or ordinance which such person has the duty to enforce, in the state, and
may be executed by any of those officers to whom it may be delivered.
Id. § 816; Li C. art. 673, para. 2.
100. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:7 (1986); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.2a
(West 1982).
101. Lf C. art. 704.
102. See supra note 96.
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Second, a warrant must satisfy certain requirements to be valid.
The L8 Code requires that the warrant show appropriate authority,"0 3 be
examined by the judge himself,"° and indicate the name of the official
authorized to make the arrest.' United States modem law requires that
the warrant be authorized by the court,10 6 be based on a reasonable be-
lief that the person has committed a particular offense,'0 7 and specify the
name of the person to be arrested.10 8 The requirements of both legal
systems attempt to minimize the chance of an error in arrest or the abuse
of power by responsible officials. The laws in both societies aim at the
ultimate goal of preventing arbitrary arrests.'0 9
2. Release on Bail
Bail, in the criminal law context, is money deposited with the court
to secure the release of a person from custody. The deposit is posted on
the condition that the defendant will forfeit that amount if he does not
appear in court as ordered.' 10 Imprisonment of a person while pending
trial, even temporarily, raises several issues such as infliction of punish-
ment prior to judicial determination of guilt, undermining the presump-
tion of innocence until proof of guilt is established, and inhibition of the
ability to prepare for defense. On the other hand, there are concerns that
the accused may flee from the jurisdiction or avoid standing trial. The
entitlement of release on bail addresses these very issues.
The lawmakers of the L8 Dynasty were apparently aware of these
issues when they provided that "(in the case of minor offenses) whenever
relatives or old friends should be allowed to bail the offender out and yet
they are not given that option, the penalty to be imposed [on the person
responsible] shall be eighty strokes of the heavy stick.""' This provision
balances several considerations such as the seriousness of the offense, the
interests of the state in having the accused appear at trial, and the inter-
ests of the accused in minimizing unnecessary hardship.
In the United States, the right to bail is provided by the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution." 2 It was statutorily implemented by
103. Lit C. art. 704.
104. Id. art. 673.
105. Id. art. 701.
106. See supra note 96.
107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 813 (West 1985).
108. Id. § 815.
109. TA VAN TAI, supra note 57, at 61.
110. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 73 (5th ed. 1983); FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(e)(1).
111. Lif C. art. 663, para. 1.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required."). One commentator
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the Judiciary Act of 1789.113
The right to bail has become a basic constitutional right in the
United States judicial system. Section 3142(a) of Title 18 of the United
States Code provides that "[u]pon the appearance before a judicial officer
of a person charged with an offense, the judicial officer shall issue an
order that, pending trial, the person be... released on personal recogni-
zance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond." '114
This provision reflects several characteristics found in Article 663 of
the L8 Code. First, the privilege applies only to less serious offenses.
The American privilege applies to an offense not "punishable by
death,"1 '5 and the L6 Code extends the privilege to "minor offenses."' 1 6
Although the extent of application varies, the underlying idea is the
same; for some minor offenses, unnecessarily depriving a person of his
liberty prior to trial is not justified. Second, both provisions balance the
interests of the accused against the interests of the state. The accused's
liberty interest is preferred to the state's interest in assuring the accused's
prompt appearance at trial. Third, both provisions recognize that the
main purpose of pretrial imprisonment is to assure the accused's appear-
ance at trial and not to punish him. Therefore, when a less intrusive
means can achieve that purpose, that means should be pursued. The ra-
tionale for both provisions is that the law should avoid unnecessary hard-
ship to the defendant.
The language in both provisions reflects the essential purpose of bail,
which is to secure the accused's appearance in court. Thus, that right
should never be denied for the purpose of punishment.' 17 That warning
is confirmed in a United States Supreme Court decision in 1835 by Jus-
tice Story:
A recognizance of bail, in a criminal case, is taken to secure the due
attendance of the party accused, to answer the indictment, and to sub-
mit to a trial, and the judgment of the court thereon. It is not designed
as a satisfaction for the offence, when it is forfeited and paid; but as a
suggests three alternative interpretations for the clause. One is that the clause provides an
absolute right to bail. Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crises in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
959 (1965).
113. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 STAT. 73, 91 (1789) ("And upon all arrests in criminal
cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death.").
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (1988).
115. Id.
116. See supra text accompanying note 111.
117. Reynolds v. United States, 80 S.Ct. 30, 32-33 (1959) (bail application was granted
pending appeal); see Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197, 197 (1960); see also Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
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means of compelling the party to submit to the trial and punishment,
which the law ordains for his offense. 18
The Court made clear that the right to bail cannot be denied for
punishment purposes. Such improper denial would amount to infliction
of punishment prior to judicial determination of guilt. The release of an
accused on bail also makes it easier for the accused to prepare for his
defense,119 as it is more convenient for the accused to consult his lawyer,
gather evidence, or prepare witnesses. The granting of this right also
preserves the presumption of innocence before proof of guilt. 12 0 The no-
tion of "presumption of innocence" suggests that one cannot be impris-
oned upon mere accusation pending a judicial determination of guilt.121
Finally, availability of this right prevents unnecessary interruption of
one's life while waiting for proper adjudication of the case. The entitle-
ment of the right to bail in the Le Code'2 2 serves these same purposes.
Although the lawmakers in each society may have considered differ-
ent factors in securing this right, both laws reflect the same purpose in
minimizing any unnecessary hardship on the defendant prior to a judicial
determination of his guilt. Provision of this right further protects the
individual from unwarranted government intrusion.
3. Speedy Trial
As with the right to release on bail, undue delay of trial also raises
issues such as prolonged pretrial imprisonment, undue hardship prior to
the determination of guilt, and impairment of the accused's defense.
Under the L6 Code, the accused was entitled to a prompt disposition of
his case. Article 671 of the L6 Code provides that "[j]udges examining
cases who procrastinate beyond the time period stipulated therefor and
fail to render timely decisions shall be punished as provided by law.' 123
The requirement of a speedy trial also applied to retrial. Article 688
states, "Whenever, following an appeal to the Throne, a case is remanded
to another court for retrial and the regulation specifying a time limit for
a new trial (two months for important cases and one month for unimpor-
tant cases) is violated, the prosecutor responsible shall be fined."' 24 Both
118. Exparte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835).
119. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. at 4.
120. Id.
121. d at 8 (Jackson & Frankfurter, JJ., concurring).
122. Li C. art. 663.
123. Id. art. 671.
124. Id. art. 688.
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provisions in the L8 Code emphasize the need for timely adjudications in
order to protect the interests of the defendant.
The Framers of the United States Constitution considered the right
to a speedy trial important enough to be specified in the Bill of Rights.125
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in pertinent
part, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial." '12 6 The right has been recognized
as one of the basic and fundamental rights in United States jurispru-
dence.'27 Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides that:
If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or
in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to an-
swer to the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a
defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information
or complaint. 12
8
The right to a speedy trial reflects three main purposes: (1) it pro-
tects the accused from prolonged pretrial imprisonment; (2) it relieves
the accused from undue harassment caused by an untried accusation; and
(3) it ensures that the defense will not be impaired because witnesses are
no longer available after a long period of time.129 The timeliness of adju-
dication required under the L8 Code seeks to serve these same purposes.
4. Public Trial
A public trial is one which is open to the public and which any
member of the public may attend.130 The lawmakers of the L8 Dynasty
wrote that "[o]n the day of the trial, the high dignitaries and judges in
charge of the case have to conduct a public hearing jointly to discern
right and wrong, in such a manner as to satisfy the people's sense ofjus-
tice." 13 1 A provision in the L6 Procedural Code requires that the judge
try cases in the "yaman hall" [village house] "so that everyone [could]
hear what [was] said or submitted." 132 The Procedural Code goes so far
as to require that the content of the judgment, "including the reasoning,
had to be posted for all parties to copy; if the judgment was obscure and
125. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
126. Id.
127. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
128. 18 U.S.C. app. 48(b) (1982).
129. 6 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 48:18 (2d ed.
1987); see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
130. Radin, The Right To A Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L. Q. 381, 391 (1932).
131. Lt C. art. 720, para. 1 (emphasis added).
132. TA VAN TAI, supra note 57, at 81 n.244.
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the litigants were unable to copy it," the parties might have grounds for
appeal. 133 The concern underlying these provisions is apparently the ap-
pearance of justice. The L6 Code states explicitly that the purpose of the
requirement of a public trial is to "satisfy the people's sense of justice."
Undoubtedly, the drafters of the U_ Code recognized that the "appear-
ance of justice" was necessary to satisfy "the people's sense of justice."
Thus, the trial must be conducted in a public place and in such a manner
as to insure that "everyone can hear what is said or submitted."'
134
The appearance of justice also plays an important role in the United
States criminal justice system. The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "[in] all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a... public trial."' 135
The enumeration of this right in the Bill of Rights reflects a deeply-
rooted notion in the common law that "justice must satisfy the appear-
ance of justice." 136 In United States jurisprudence, a public trial is "an
essential guarantee against any attempt to employ the courts as instru-
ments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial [is] sub-
ject to a contemporaneous review in the form of public opinion [is]
regarded as an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.'137
The requirement of a public trial serves several purposes. First, the
public setting fosters the people's confidence in the judicial process by
allowing them to witness the operation of the judicial system. 138 This is
precisely why the L6 Code required that the trial be held in the yaman
hall. 139 Second, a public trial prevents possible abuse of the defendant's
rights by the court or the prosecution that might arise in a secret trial.14
The United States Supreme Court in In re Oliver141 recognized that:
The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been vari-
ously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish In-
quisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to
133. Id. at 81 n.246.
134. See supra text accompanying note 132.
135. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
136. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. I1, 14 (1954)).
137. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949).
138. State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 87-88, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (1966) ("It is not unrealis-
tic even in this day to believe that public inclusion affords citizens a form of legal education
and hopefully promotes confidence in the fair administration of justice.").
139. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
140. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (Defendant was convicted of contempt in a trial
from which the public was excluded.).
141. Id. at 268-70.
19891
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet 142.... Whatever
other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be conducted in
public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been
recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as
instruments of persecution. 1
43
The appearance of justice is the major concern shared by both the
L6 Code and United States laws. It is important to foster confidence in
the judicial process and to legitimize the legal system. This concern goes
beyond mere justice; it considers other factors which are important com-
ponents of a just system: the public confidence in the judicial process and
the legitimization of the system.
5. Right to Confront Witnesses
Under the L6 Code, an accused had the right to confront the witness
against him at trial. The lawmakers under the L6 Dynasty recognized
the importance of allowing the defendant to ascertain the basis of the
accusations against him. Article 671 of the L8 Code provides that "if the
defendant presents himself in court but the plaintiff or informer fails to
come to be confronted, after twenty days, the plaintiff or informer shall
be found guilty of [the crime or tort] falsely accused."'" Another provi-
sion of the Code imposes a penalty on any judge who fails to schedule
such a confrontation within a reasonable period of time.'45
The right to confront the witness is explicitly stated in the United
States Constitution. 146 The provision requires that "in all criminal prose-
cutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
142. A lettre de cachet was a document bearing the King's private seal (cachet) which
referred to the means frequently used by the King to interfere with the ordinary course of
justice. Radin, supra note 130, at 388.
143. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268-70 (footnotes omitted). Other benefits identified by the
Court were: (1) if the public trial comes to the attention of key witnesses unknown to the
parties, those witnesses may voluntarily come forward and testify; (2) spectators learn about
their government and acquire confidence in the legal system. Id. at 270 n.24.
144. Lf C. art. 671, para. 2.
145. LP, C. art. 677 ("Any judge who postpones the confrontation of parties to a subse-
quent date but then, for months beyond that date, fails to organize such a confrontation shall
be fined.").
146. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In the West, the right to confront the witness at one's crimi-
nal prosecution dates back to 1603 when Sir Walter Raleigh was accused of treason against the
Crown. The case against him was based on the confession of Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged
co-conspirator, implicating Raleigh in a plot to seize the throne and establish Arabella Stuart
as Queen of England. Sir Raleigh asked to have Cobham testify as a witness, but his request
was never granted. Were Cobham allowed to testify at trial, he would have retracted his con-
fession. On the basis of this confession, Sir Raleigh was sentenced to death for high treason. I
J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 334-35 (1833).
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witnesses against him." 147 The right did not apply to state courts until
1965 when the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that
the right was fundamental and essential to a fair trial and, therefore, ap-
plicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 148 Without the protection of the right to confront wit-
nesses, criminal justice would have no meaning because:
[Prosecutors] would irequently allege matters which the prisoner de-
nied and called upon them to prove. The proof was usually given by
reading depositions, confessions of accomplices, letters, and the like;
and this occasioned frequent demands by the prisoner to have his "ac-
cusers," i.e., the witnesses against him, brought before him face to
face. 149
Although trial procedures were different in fifteenth century Viet-
nam, one can assume the lawmakers of the L8 Dynasty were aware that
denying the accused the right to confront his accuser would undermine
the integrity of the judicial process. The underlying message in both the
L6 Code and United States law is that the accused must be allowed to
confront his accuser.
D. Contractual Relationships
The L6 Code did not have distinct contract law provisions, except
those regulating business transactions. Some of those regulations resem-
ble contract law provisions in United States jurisprudence. The best ex-
amples are the provisions on statutes of limitations and the incapacity of
minors to contract. These provisions suggest that the lawmakers of the
L6 Dynasty were acutely aware of typical problems that might arise in
contractual relationships.
1. Statutes of Limitation
The term "statute of limitations" refers to statutory provisions that
prescribe time periods beyond which claims may be barred.5 0 The L6
Code contained a provision specifying a time period within which a cred-
itor must act to recover his debt. Article 588 of the L8 Code provides
that "[a]ny creditor who fails to make a claim before the prescription
period ends shall lose the money loaned. (The prescription period is fixed
at thirty years for paternal relatives and twenty years for other peo-
147. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
148. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1965).
149. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1970) (quoting 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 (1883)).
150. 3 B. WrrIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Action § 306 (3d ed. 1985).
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pie.)"' 15  A decree issued during the Hong Duc period includes similar
provisions but adds that "if there is evidence that the debtor requested
deferment of payment to a certain year, month, or date, then this pre-
scription period does not apply."' 52 In short, a claim to recover debt
must be brought within a specified period except when the debtor has
made a new arrangement.
In the West, the concept of limitation on prrsonal actions within a
prescribed time period did not come into use until the enactment of the
Limitation Act of 1623 in England. 53  Patterned after that law, all
United States jurisdictions have enacted similar statutes which specify
time limits in which to file suit to recover debt.' 54 In California, for ex-
ample, "an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded
upon an instrument of writing" must be filed "within two years." 155 This
statutory period applies to an action to recover debt.' 56 A claim to re-
cover the debt is barred if the creditor fails to file his claim before the
two-year period has run.'57
If the debtor acts to acknowledge the existing debt, his action may
restart the statutory period and thus revive the old cause of action.,
58
This doctrine, generally known as the revival doctrine, recognizes that
the running of the statutory period does not bar the claim if the debtor
has made a new promise to repay the debt. 159 The Second Restatement
of Contracts states that "[a] promise to pay all or part of an antecedent
contractual or quasi-contractual indebtedness owed by the promisor is
binding if the indebtedness is still enforceable or would be except for the
effect of a statute of limitations."' 60 In other words, a promise to pay, if
made before the statutory period has run, has the effect of removing the
151. Lif C. art. 588, para. 2.
152. H.D.T.C.T., supra note 46, para. 125; see also Ta Van Tai, Vietnam's Code of the Le
Dynasty (1428-1788), 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 523, 530 n.33 (1982).
153. The Statute of Limitations, 21 James 1, ch. 16, §§ 1, 2 (1623); see also infra note 182
(statute of limitations in adverse possession).
154. Note, Developments of the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1179
(1950). For a discussion of modem American statutes of limitations, see Little, A Comparison
of the Statutes of Limitations, 21 IND. L.J. 23 (1945); Mix, State Statutes of Limitations: Con-
trasted and Compared, 3 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 106 (1931).
155. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 339 (West 1982). The statutory period for a similar cause of
action based upon written contract is four years. Id. § 337.
156. See Baxter v. King, 81 Cal. App. 192, 194, 253 P. 172, 172-73 (1927); 3 B. WITKN,
supra note 150, at § 369.
157. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 339 (West 1982).
158. Id. § 360; 3 B. WrrKIN, supra note 150, at §§ 516, 517.
159. Note, supra note 154, at 1254.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 82(1) (1979).
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time restrictions of the statute of limitations. 161
The prescription of a statutory period serves two major purposes. It
ensures that an interest held by a person is free of "ancient obliga-
tions." 162 Without time limitations, one can have a claim that is hun-
dreds of years old. Even if the claim were valid, it is not fair to require a
person to defend a claim where the "evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."1 63 It is indeed difficult for
the court to adjudicate a claim when evidence is beyond the reach of
anyone. 16' Additionally, preclusion of an otherwise valid claim avoids
the disruptive effect caused by uncertainty in contractual transactions.1
65
An investment plan, for example, would be spoiled if someone showed up
with an ancient debt instrument against the prospective investor.
Although the formulation of the law on statutes of limitations in the
L6 Dynasty preceded a similar effort in the West by centuries, traditional
Vietnamese and modem United States laws share several common fea-
tures. In both legal systems, one can forego a valid claim by failing to
make the claim within a period of time. Under the L8 Code, the creditor
would "lose the money loaned." 66 Similarly, in California, the creditor
is barred from recovering his money. 7 From the creditor's perspective,
this may seem like an outright legalized taking of his money. The laws,
however, are concerned not only with the interests of the creditor, but
also with those of the debtor and the market. The laws must balance
competing interests, including the fairness to debtors, the difficulty in
adjudication of claims, and the uncertainty created in business transac-
tions. The statutes of limitations choose to further the interests of society
161. See id. comment b, illustrations 1, 2.
162. Note, supra note 154, at 1185 n.87 (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) ("A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long
time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away with-
out your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can
ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of man.").
163. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
164. Note, supra note 154, at 1185 n.90 (quoting 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2 (1540)).
For as much as the time of limitation appointed for suing ... extend and be so far
and long time past, that it is above the remembrance of any living man truly to try
and know the perfect certainty of such things, as hath or shall come in trial... to the
great danger of men's consciences that have or shall be impanelled in any jury for the
trial of the same.
Id.
165. Id. at 1185. For example, a decedent's estate may be called upon to answer claims of
debt arising from hundreds of years in the past, or a potential of a claim pending against him
may discourage his plan for a business venture.
166. Lf C. art. 588.
167. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 339 (West 1982).
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as a whole, even at the cost of the interests of creditors. Such provisions,
however, still allow a reasonable period of time within which a person
should bring his claim, and they recognize the "revival" mechanism
which further protects creditors. Although formulated centuries apart,
the laws converge on a very fine point: the protection of society's inter-
ests should be furthered only with laws that minimize harm to the indi-
vidual's interests.
2. Incapacity of Minors to Contract
The responsibility of making law often entails the balancing of inter-
ests. This balancing task may involve the creation of laws that are incon-
sistent with existing law, particularly where the inconsistency is
necessary to serve a prevailing interest. In the case of incapacity of mi-
nors to contract, the law prefers the protection of minors to the enforce-
ment of otherwise valid contracts. Under the L8 Code, a minor has no
capacity to contract, and a contract entered into by a minor is void. 168
The applicable provision states:
Whenever a minor orphan girl sells herself without being assisted by a
guarantor, the purchaser as well as the scribe and the witnesses receive
the light stick or the heavy stick in accordance with the law ... [t]he
sale price shall be reimbursed to the purchaser and the contract
voided. Orphans aged fifteen or over who live alone in a destitute con-
dition shall be authorized to sell themselves voluntarily.1 69
United States contract law recognizes that a contract is not binding
on a party that does not have legal capacity. 70 Infancy or minority is an
example of such incapacity. 171
The laws on the incapacity of minors to contract in both legal sys-
tems have several similarities. First, under both systems, a contract en-
tered into by a minor is not binding because his manifestation of assent is
legally ineffective. 172 Second, the age of majority is fixed by law. Most
American states have adopted eighteen as the age of majority. 173 The age
of majority under the L8 Code is fifteen.174 Both designations reflect an
arbitrary age at which the law considers that one has reached adulthood.
168. Lit C. art. 313.
169. Id.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12(1) (1979).
171. Id. § 12(2)(b). According to the Restatement, a person reaches majority when he or
she turns eighteen. Id. § 14.
172. Id. § 12 comment c; Lf, C. art. 313.
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 comment a (1979).
174. See supra note 54 (legal maturity age).
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In the L8 Code, a minor can sell herself once she reaches the age of
fifteen.1 75 Similarly, under United States law, the presumption of inca-
pacity is removed when the minor reaches the age of majority.
Third, upon avoidance of the contract the minor party has to return
all consideration, in part or whole.176 United States jurisdictions are not
uniform in requiring the return of the consideration received as a condi-
tion for disaffirmance.117 Both legal systems, however, recognize the un-
fairness of allowing the minor to unilaterally disaffirm the contract
without an obligation to return the received consideration.
The laws on the incapacity of minors to contract present another
example of the lawmakers' emphasis on the well-being of society as a
whole. To fulfill this objective, lawmakers must balance competing inter-
ests. The balancing may result in curtailing the interests of some individ-
uals to further the interests of others. In this case, the contractual
interests of an adult who contracts with a minor may be sacrificed to
protect the minor. The society as a whole benefits from this compromise
because children should not be taken advantage of in contractual
relations.
E. Statutes on Real Estate
Land regulation is a major focus of the L8 Code. The Code devotes
thirty-two of its 722 articles to regulations on real property. 178 The topic
covers a wide range of regulatory matters from land title and labor dis-
putes to land inheritance. The two concepts that are most recognizable
in United States jurisprudence are adverse possession and easement.
1. Adverse Possession
Adverse possession is a method of acquisition of title to real prop-
erty by occupation for a statutory period under certain conditions. 179
The concept of adverse possession was not alien to the lawmakers of the
L8 Dynasty. Article 387 of the L8 Code states that:
Men aged sixteen or older and women aged twenty or older who, after
the prescription period has passed, forcibly claim ownership of land
[once belonging to them] that has been tilled or inhabited by their pa-
175. See supra text accompanying note 169.
176. Lf C. art. 313.
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 comment c (1979).
178. 1 TAI, Huy, & LIEM, supra note 11, at 191.
179. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 27 (5th ed. 1983). The claimant must satisfy certain con-
ditions including proof of nonpermissive use which is actual, open, notorious, and adverse to
the title holder. Id
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ternal relatives or by outsiders (the prescription peribd [beyond which
former owners cannot claim their land] is thirty years for relatives and
twenty years for outsiders), shall receive eighty strokes of the heavy
stick and shall forfeit their property. This provision shall not apply in
the case when they have just returned after a period of war or of dis-
persion of the population.180
In brief, one who has occupied the land for a long period of time without
clear title is preferred to one who suddenly appears to claim title to the
land, even with a valid deed.
American statutes also limit the time period in which landowners
must bring an action to recover land that is adversely occupied by an-
other. A typical statute reads:
An action to recover the title to or possession of real property shall be
brought within twenty-one years after the cause thereof accrued, but if
a person entitled to bring such action, at the time the cause thereof
accrues, is within the age of minority, of unsound mind, or imprisoned,
such person, after the expiration of twenty-one years from the time the
cause of action accrues, may bring such action within ten years after
such disability is removed.1 81
Both the L8 Code and modem United States law share most of the
essential elements of adverse possession. First, the provisions on adverse
possession of both legal systems specifically prescribe a period of limita-
tions.18 2 The statutory period under the L6 Code is thirty years for rela-
tives and twenty years for strangers.183 In the United States, the periods
of limitations vary from state to state, but all statutes provide a specific
180. Lit C. art. 387; see also id. art. 353 ("Whoever improperly denounces unregistered
land occupied for a long time by other people or uses a deed dating back to a distant genera-
tion to contest forcibly the ownership of such land shall be demoted two grades."); Ta Van
Tai, supra note 152, at 540.
181. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.04 (Anderson 1988).
182. The western doctrine of adverse possession has a long history dating back to the thir-
teenth century. Originally, an English statute in 1275 allowed the plaintiff in an ejection action
to establish title by evidence dating back to the occurrence of an ancient event such as the first
year of the reign of Richard I (1189) or the coronation of Henry II. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 15.1, at 755 (1952). The reference time was then changed to 1242, and new
reference points had to be fixed from time to time. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 81 (2d ed. 1959).
Not until 1540 was the method of fixing the statutory period to a specific date in the past
replaced by a period of time starting from the date when the plaintiff was required to assert his
title. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra, § 15.1, at 756. This method designated a pe-
riod of time starting from the time the cause of action arose and within which the claimant
must raise his claim or be forever barred from raising that claim. The provision gave rise to
the concept of "statutory period" which is used in modern statutes on adverse possession.
183. Lt C. art. 387.
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period within which quiet title claims must be brought.18 4 Second, the
primary effect of these statutes is the simultaneous extinguishment of old
title and the creation of new title by operation of law.185 At the running
of the statutory period, the old owners can no longer claim ownership to
the property, and at the same time title is vested completely in the new
owner. By specifying a prescription period, the provisions imply that the
owners still have a valid claim to their land until the period expires.
Third, the provisions share the same dual purpose, to quiet title and pre-
clude disputes.18 6
Additionally, both legal systems recognize some defenses to a claim
of title by adverse possession. Under the L8 Code, defenses include in-
fancy of the title holder and absence from the land due to war or popula-
tion dispersion.18 1 Similarly, defenses in United States jurisdictions may
include infancy, unsound mind, or imprisonment.188
Despite the differences in time and culture between the traditional
Vietnamese law and modem United States law, the L8 Code's provision
on adverse possession is strikingly similar to its counterpart in United
States law.
2. Easement
Easement is a right of use over the property of another.'8 9 For in-
stance, A owns a piece of land which is surrounded by a lot owned by B.
A may have the right to a passage way through B's land. An imperial
decree issued during the reign of Le Thanh Tong states:
Owners of land, ponds and gardens surrounding state land shall sur-
render a portion of their properties necessary to build roads and lanes
to permit entry into and exit from the enclaved land, ponds, and gar-
dens and shall not obstruct such movements. Violators of this provi-
sion shall be reported to the authorities for detention, so that access to
the enclave land shall not be obstructed and such land shall not be left
uncultivated. 190
Similarly, in United States law, section 450 of the Restatement of
Property defines an easement as:
184. Taylor, Titles to Land by Adverse Possession, 20 IowA L. REv. 551, 554 (1935) (list of
states with respective periods of limitation).
185. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 182, § 15.2, at 759.
186. Id.
187. Lit C. art. 387. Infancy age was under sixteen for men or twenty for women. Id.
188. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.04 (Anderson 1988).
189. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (5th ed. 1983).
190. H.D.T.C.T., supra note 46, para. 174 (translation adopted from Ta Van Tai, supra
note 152, at 542 n.104.).
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[A]n interest in land in the possession of another which
(a) entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of
the land in which the interest exists;
(b) entitles him to protection as against third persons from interfer-
ence in such use or enjoyment; [and]
(c) is not subject to the will of the possessor of the land. 191
These two provisions reflect several similarities. First, both laws
recognize that a stranger is entitled to an interest in land possessed by
another. The L6 Code prohibits the owner of the surrounding land from
obstructing the passage through his land to and from the enclosed
land.192 The Restatement of Property recognizes "an interest in land in
the possession of another."' 93 The recognition of title by a stranger is
significant because ownership normally means total and complete control
of the property owned. Here, the laws recognize that under certain cir-
cumstances, "complete ownership" is not justified.
Both provisions recognize the need to allow the owner of the en-
closed land to use or enjoy his land. The L6 Code allows the easement
interest only when it is "necessary to build roads and lanes to permit"
access to or from the enclosed land. 194 The Property Restatement recog-
nizes the interest when it is necessary for the owner of the enclosed land
to use or enjoy his land.' 95 In both laws, this necessity must exist to
justify interference with ownership of another.
Both laws recognize an easement as granting only a "limited" inter-
est. Under the L8 Code, the owner of the surrounding land surrenders
only "a portion" of his land and only for limited purposes such as build-
ing roads or lanes for passage. 196 The Restatement characterizes an ease-
ment as a nonpossessory interest. Thus, it involves a lesser degree of
control than a possessory interest. 197 For instance, if A has an interest in
a way over land possessed by B, A's control of such land is limited to the
extent that is necessary for him to use that way, but he does not have the
right to exclude others from making use of the land in anyway that does
not interfere with his interest. 198 Both laws balance the interest of the
owner of the enclosed land with that of the owner of the surrounding
land.
191. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
192. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
193. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
194. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
195. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 476, 482 (1944).
196. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.




Finally, in the case of completely enclosed land, the easement inter-
est is taken irrespective of the consent of the owner of the surrounding
land. Under the L8 Code, if the surrounding land's owner objects, he is
subject to penal sanction.1 99 The Restatement states specifically that an
easement interest "is not subject to the will of the possessor of the
land."" °  Thus, both legal systems recognize the prevailing interest of
ensuring the right to full use and enjoyment of the enclosed land by its
owner, even over the objection of the owner of the surrounding land.
The laws on easement in both legal systems adhere to the rule that
all landowners are entitled to full use and enjoyment of their land. How-
ever, when the right of one landowner abridges the same right of another,
the lawmakers in both societies resort to restricting one owner's right to
full ownership to the extent necessary to allow the other owner to fully
use or enjoy his land. The purpose of these provisions is not only to
protect the individual's interests but also to maximize the benefit to soci-
ety as a whole.
IV. CONCLUSION
From the discussion in this Note, one can formulate some probing
questions. Are the fundamental rights of an accused unique to the
American civil liberty scheme? Should the search for the origins of some
advanced legal concepts be limited to the United States or western legal
tradition? Would further study of the Vietnamese ancient legal system
help to broaden one's knowledge of the United States legal system, tradi-
tional and modern?
Given two legal systems which are separated both in time and dis-
tance, such similarities suggest that there may be a universal principle of
law that governs this convergency. Although it is not "strange that there
is no portion of the law which is uniform in all nations,"' ' there must
be an underlying force that keeps the formulation of traditional
Vietnamese law and modern United States law on a convergent course.
If one considers the legal concepts found in both bodies of law and their
similarities, one can derive some common themes. The most obvious
themes include the effort to tailor the law to the peculiar needs of society,
the protection of the accused in judicial proceedings, the commitment to
fairness and reliability in the judicial process, and the extensive balancing
199. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
200. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
201. LePaulle, supra note 40, at 855.
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of various interests in the promulgation of law to achieve social fairness,
economic sensibility, and individual dignity.
Even if there were few similarities between the two legal systems,
one can benefit from a simple introduction to a different legal system.
One commentator recognizes that "[i]ndeed the national law, when com-
pared with actual or ancient institutions of other countries, appears more
clearly, like a painting, the colors of which are accentuated, when a land-
scape is put around the objects or personages in the foreground."20 2
Understanding one legal system aids in the understanding of an-
other legal system. This premise is the essence of the study of compara-
tive law. In this Note, understanding the United States legal tradition is
a tool for exploring the little known legal tradition of early Vietnamese
society. Although the traditional Vietnamese and modem American so-
cieties are culturally unrelated, the L8 Code still manifests numerous ad-
vanced features found in modem United States law. These similarities
are not coincidental. They reflect a conscious and ingenious effort on the
part of the traditional Vietnamese lawmakers to improve the meaning of
law.
A comparison of traditional Vietnamese law and modem United
States law is subject to a serious prejudice against the Vietnamese law
due to the great difference in time. However, the convergency of the two
systems in so many respects is strong evidence attesting to the early ad-
vancement, sophistication, and maturity of the traditional Vietnamese
law, especially the L& Code.
202. Escarra, supra note 40, at 302.
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APPENDIX - THE L CODE
A. Time of Codification
The date of promulgation of the L6 Code remains an unsettled mat-
ter. Professor Deloustal, who translated a copy of the L8 Code into
French in 1911, maintained that the Code was promulgated about
1777.203 He reached this conclusion based on the date printed on his
copy of the Code and on the fact that the promulgation of the work was
mentioned in an early nineteenth century publication. 2"
Professor Vu Van Mau pointed out that the date to which Deloustal
referred was actually the date of the copy's edition, not of the Code's
promulgation. He argued that Deloustal mistook the Quoc Trieu Tu
Tung Dieu Le (Procedural Code of the L8 Dynasty) for the Le Trieu
Hinh Luat (Articles of Laws of the National Dynasty).20 5 The Proce-
dural Code was indeed mentioned in the publication as being promul-
gated in 1777,206 but the Articles of Laws was an edition of the L8 Code
which was hand copied after the end of the L8 Dynasty.20 7 If the work
had been copied during the L6 Dynasty, the word "LU" would never
have been used in the title because it would have constituted a serious
contempt of the Emperor to refer to the Ten huy or "forbidden name" in
any manner.208 The promulgation of the L6 Code, therefore, must have
been completed prior to 1777.
Evidence from various writings indicates that the L8 Code was first
promulgated during the Hong Duc period (1470-1497).2o9 However,
Professor Ta Van Tai210 has forcefully argued that many articles of the
L6 Code were in existence even before the Hong Duc period. 211 Accord-
ing to Professor Tai, many provisions were enacted during the reign of
the first ruler of the L6 Dynasty, Emperor L6 Thai To.212 The first ver-
sion of the L6 Code was a six volume book entitled Luat Thu (Book of
203. Deloustal, La Justice Dans L'Ancien Annam: Traduction et Commentaire du Code des
Li 9 BULLETIN DE L'ECOLE FRANCAISE - D'EXTREME ORIENT 91 n.2 (1909).
204. Vu Van Mau, supra note I, at v. The early nineteenth century work was PHAN Huy
CHU, LICH TRIEU HIEN CHUONG LOAI CHI (Annals of the Laws and Institutions of Succes-
sive Dynasties) (Cao Quang trans. 1957) (Vietnam 1820). Id.
205. I
206. Id. at 233; see also I TAI, Huy, & LIEM, supra note 11, at 21-28.
207. Vu VAN MAU, supra note 3, at 234.
208. Vu Quoc THONG, supra note 19, at 54. Vietnamese custom forbids the mention of
the imperial name in any circumstance, even in official documents. Id.
209. Vu VAN MAU, supra note 3, at 232-34; see, eg., Young, supra note 15, at 8.
210. See infra note 216.
211. 1 TAI, Huy LIEM, supra note 11, at 24-26.
212. Id
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Law) which consisted of twelve chapters found in the subsequent La
Code.2 13 As the Code was modified by subsequent emperors, several
other chapters were added to the existing body of law.214 This occurred
even after the Hong Due period.
The debate centers on whether the major portions of the Code were
promulgated before or during the Hong Due period. For the purposes of
this Note, the author assumes that a substantial portion of the Code was
in existence at least during the Hong Due period, or before 1470 when
Emperor L8 Thanh Tong changed his reign title from Quang Thuan
(1460-1469) to Hong Due (1470-1497).215
B. Qualification of the Translation
The L8 Code was translated into English for the first time in 1979 by
Professors Ta Van Tai,21 6 Tran Van Liem217 and Nguyen Ngoc Huy.218
These three distinguished scholars and jurists were exceptionally quali-
fied to translate and annotate the document. Collectively, their back-
grounds include expertise in law, history, politics, and Sino-Vietnamese
literature.219  These disciplines are important to a critical study of
Vietnamese law.
To ensure the integrity of the translation, the authors took pains to
examine numerous Vietnamese documents, compare the original texts of
the Code against the French translation, and consult several Chinese
213. Id. One author states that Nguyen Trai, Emperor L8 Thai To's advisor, wrote the six
volume book in 1440-1442 but that the work was lost. NGUYEN LUONG BICH, supra note 9, at
583. However, he cites no evidence to support his contention.
214. 1 TAI, Huy, & LIEM, supra note 11, at 24-28.
215. VU VAN MAU, supra note 3, at 232-37.
216. Professor Ta Van Tai formerly taught at Vietnam's National Institute of Adminstra-
tion and Saigon University Faculty of Law. He has authored or co-authored a number of
publications in Vietnamese and English, including PHUONG PHAP KHOA Hoc XA Hoi (Social
Research Methods) (1974). Recently, he has published several articles including The Status of
Women in Traditional Vietnam, 15 J. ASIAN Hisr. 97 (1981), and Vietnam's Code of the Li
Dynasty (1428-1788), 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 523 (1982). He is currently a member of the Massa-
chusetts Bar and a Research Associate at East Asian Legal Studies Center, Harvard Law
School. See Correspondence, supra note 34, at 3.
217. Justice Tran Van Liem was a former Associate Justice of the Vietnamese Supreme
Court. He also taught at Saigon University Faculty of Law. He holds a doctorate degree in
Civil Law from Saigon University. Justice Liem published extensively in the Vietnamese Law
Review. See Correspondence, supra note 34, at 11.
218. Professor Nguyen Ngoc Huy formerly taught at Vietnam's National Institute of Ad-
minstration and Faculties of Law at Hue and Can Tho Universities. He holds a doctorate
degree in Political Science from Paris, France. Professor Huy wrote several books in
Vietnamese and French. He is currently a Research Associate at the East Asian Legal Studies
Center, Harvard Law School. See id. at 13.
219. Id. at 7.
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Codes that had some influence on the L6 Code.22 ° In 1987, the English
translation was finally published in a three-volume book titled The Lif
Code: Law In Traditional Vietnam, A Comparative Sino-Vietnamese
Legal Study with Historical-Juridical Analysis and Annotations. 21 This
voluminous work contains not only the translation of the L8 Code but
also detailed annotations of each article in the Code. The annotations
generally explain the provisions, compare them with similar provisions
found in other Chinese Codes, and relate the subject matter to other per-
tinent legal or historical materials. 222 The book was intended to be a
"long lasting reference book" on traditional law in Vietnam. 223 This in-
tense effort has produced the most comprehensive discussion to date of
the L8 Code, or for that matter, of Vietnamese ancient law, in English.
This book is an authoritative reference on traditional Vietnamese law.224
220. 1 TAI, Huy, & LIEM, supra note 11, at 44-45; Correspondence, supra note 34, at 5.
221. 1 TAI, Huy, & LIEM, supra note 11.
222. Id. at 45.
223. Correspondence, supra note 34, at 5.
224. See Taylor, Book Review, 19 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 166 (1988); Woodside,
Book Review, 48 J. AsIAN STUD. 231 (1989).
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